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Soviet Third World Policy Dilemmas and
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict

by
Deven Ogden

The recent resolution of the Cambodian problems that have lingered since after World
War II are generally looked on as the product of American and Chinese action. However, Soviet
policy also had a significant impact on recent developments. By encouraging Vietnamese withdrawl
from Cambodia and by dramatically reducing foreign aid to Cambodia, the Soviet Union was
able to exert influence on Cambodia to settle the deeply rooted problems of the country.

For decades Cambodia has been the
cold war battleground of the Soviet Union,
China, and the United States who have been
the advocates of the various Cambodian
contingents. Vietnam, one of the Soviet's most
dependent clients, invaded Cambodia in the
last weeks of 1978, ousting the genocidal
Khmer Rouge from power . Yet, supported
by the Chinese, the Khmer Rouge were able
to maintain a significant resistance force to
fight a civil war that has only recently come
to a cease-fire. To complicate matters, the
US revived two non-communist Cambodian
resistance factions in protest to the Vietnamese
invasion. In 1982, these two factions--Ied by
Prince Sihanouk, former head of state of
Cambodia during the 1950s and 60s, and Son
Sann, Sihanouk's fonner prime minister-joined
with the Khmer Rouge in the resistance effort
against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin
regime.
The Cambodian civil war raged on for
years until finally, in 1989, Vietnam surprised
the world by announcing that it would withdraw all its troops from Cambodia by 1990.
In fact, it was in September of 1989 that Hanoi
claimed that all its troops had indeed withdrawn. What Vietnam had been to the US
in 1973 when the US withdrew its troops,
Cambodia was to Vietnam in 1989--Cambodia

was Vietnam's "Vietnam." Since the withdrawal, the parties have made significant
progress toward a comprehensive peace
settlement in the region. All four factions have
agreed to an enhanced UN involvement in the
settlement. The United Nations will play an
unprecedented role as it will dismantle the
Phnom Penh government and replace the
bureaucracy with its own personnel and
peacekeeping troops until UN-supervised
elections democratically empower a new
neutral government.
When the UN first proposed its
comprehensive settlement, the Hun Sen
government in Phnom Penh strongly opposed
it as it highly disadvantaged his government.
As late as December 1990, Hun Sen expressed
his contempt for such an imbalanced plan:
The Prime Minister said that his government
will never consent to the presence in Cambodia
of a large UN peacekeeping force and will not
agree to replacing the present administration with
a "UN transitional authority,· much less to
dissolving the legitimately functioning current
government before elections are held, which is
essentially what the opposition is seeking
(Vinogradov 1990).

Hun Sen continued to make such protests
throughout the various negotiations in 1991.

,
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Yet on October 23, Hun Sen signed the peace
treaty that set into action the very operations
he vowed he would never consent to.
Several explanations have been given
why Vietnam decided to unilaterally withdraw
its troops and why Phnom Penh conceded to
the UN operation. Most of the analyses focus
on the US and Chinese involvement in the
crisis and the effects of their foreign policy.
US and Chinese policies focused on isolating
Vietnam and Cambodia politically and
economically and supporting the resistance
forces in an attempt to compel Vietnamese
withdrawal and compromise in peace negotiations. However, most of these studies pay
little attention to the significant role played
by the Soviets in influencing Vietnam to
undertake an Afghanistan-like withdrawal.
While the resistance movement and the
isolation and pressure imposed by the US and
China have certainly been major factors
bringing about the Vietnamese withdrawal and
the resulting peace process, they are not the
only factors. The Soviet's role in influencing
the Vietnamese withdrawal and Phnom Penh's
cooperation in the peace process will be the
focus of this study as a contributing explanation.
Many fmd it unthinkable to believe that
the Soviet Union would undermine its own
client state by encouraging it to cooperate in
a peace settlement that would almost certainly
eliminate it froin power or at least diminish
its power profoundly. However, considering
the political, economic, and social changes
that have had such a profound impact on the
Soviet Union since 1985, a dramatic change
in its foreign policy can also be expected.
In fact, the Soviet Union had been experiencing severe dilem mas in the Third World for
some time. Gorbachev is responsible for many
policy reforms which were undertaken to deal
with these dilemmas which fall into two
categories: economic and political.

The chronic economic decline in the
Soviet Union has affected its foreign policy
in that the Soviets can no longer afford to
sustain the massive foreign aid programs it
had once implemented in the Third World:
The Soviets had learned that counterinsurgency
problems in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and
Nicaragua exacerbated risks of getting in vol ved
in a client state, meant sinking excessive
investments into unsteady political systems, andconsequently--worsened economic problems
within the world socialist system (Goodman
1991,52).

Gorbachev formally recognized the problem
with his government's foreign aid program
by issuing a decree on July 24, 1990 mandating major foreign aid reforms. Though
the Vietnamese withdrawal had already taken
place by the time Soviet aid was cut, it had
been foreseen for some time and had been a
considerable threat for Vietnam and Cambodia
to depend solely on the Soviet Union. It
became clear that they would have to bring
about political and economic changes that
would allow them to integrate with the free
market economies of the world. Vietnam's
occupation of Cambodia and the continuing
factional stalemate was, of course, a major
obstacle to this objective.
Politically, the
Soviet Union had suffered greatly in Asia and
elsewhere for Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia. The conflict threatened to increase
a US presence in the region, strengthened
Sino-US ties, and eliminated any chances for
improved relations with ASEAN, the US. and
China. The entire political environment was
very dismal for the USSR's broader strategic
objectives:
The Soviets found themselves at a disadvanw~~
in Asia as China normalized relations with th~
United States and Iapan ... The USSR, for th~
most part, was excluded from the diplomatl(
activity and burgeoning economic development
of the region, perceived by Asian states as d
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European power with threatening military assets
in the Pacific (Goodman 1991, 107-8)

It is the economic and political disadvantages that provided the incentives for the
Soviet ~ nion to take such a provocative policy
stance In pressuring Vietnam to withdraw and
allow a political settlement to take place in
Cambodia. The focus of this study will be
on these incentives and the impact they had
on Soviet policy, how that policy was implemented toward Vietnam and Cambodia and
how it contributed to the eventual Vietna;"ese
withdrawal and the progress toward a comprehensive settlement between the warring
Cambodian factions.

The Cambodian Conflict
The Cambodian conflict has dragged
on for decades and therefore has a large
~umber of significant events that have shaped
It over the years. It is a very complex conflict
with divers actors, as can be attested to by
the fact that at the 1991 Paris Conference
where the peace treaty was finally signed, the
four Cambodian factions were accompanied
by .1 ~ other countries who were integral
partIcIpants to the negotiations. To be able
to understand and analyze the conflict and the
Soviet Union's role in that conflict, a review
of the events and actors that shaped it will be
necessary.
During France's occupation of Indochina, students from all three colonies were
able to s~udy in France. In the early 1900s,
commUnism was the ideological fashion in
France, and the Indochinese students were
~utomatically attracted to this anti-imperialistic
Ideology. The most prominent of these
communist students was Nguyen Ai Quoc a
Vietnamese activist who later became kno~n
as Ho Chi Minh. During the 1920s Ho
" worked as a Communist bureaucrat' in
Moscow and elsewhere. Then, on February
3, 1930, he met with other Vietnamese

stude~ts and intellectuals in Hong Kong to
organIze the Indochina Communist Party
(ICP)" (Isaacs et al 1987, 18). The Soviet
supported ICP was active in Cambodia as well
but was mostly supported by Vietnames~
Cambodians. This was the beginning of Soviet
involvement in Cambodia.
1941 was a significant year in Cam~ia for two important events that took place.
FIrst, the French picked the next king of
Cambodia, and the 18-year-old Norodom
Sihanouk (the great-grandson of King Norodom) ascended the throne. Later that same
y~, France was invaded by Hitler's army.
WIth the French administration of Cambodia
in disarray, Japan invaded and occupied the
colony, but allowed the French administration
to continue operating. When the Japanese
surrendered in 1945, King Sihanouk declared
independence. However, when the Allied
occupation forces left Cambodia, they restored
control of the country back to the French.
The Cambodian people, and especially
Sihanouk, felt betrayed by the West.
In Vietnam, after Ho Chi Minh had
already declared independence, the country
was restored to French rule. When Ho had
d~l~~ independence, he made very strong
sollcltatlOns toward the US, but was disappointed when the US allowed France to resume
control of the country. The result was the
French-Indochina War which the French lost
~o Ho's Vietminh forces in a humiliating defeat
In 1953 at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. Both
China and the Soviet Union had supported the
Vietnamese in the war against the French.
The USSR provided some $365 million in aid
while Chinese aid totalled nearly $460 million.
However, it was probably because of China's
ext~n.sive aid that Vietnam began seeking
addltlOnal dependence on the Soviets:
The massive support that the Chinese provided
to the Vietnamese exacerbated the dilemma of
their relationship with China. The Vietnamese
Communists perceived that revolutionary debts
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can be weapons of exploitation in the hands of
the Chinese which made it necessary for them
to seek compensating support from the Soviet
Union" (Buszynski 1986, 151).

At the same time, King Sihanouk was leading
his "Royal Crusade for Independence" in
Cambodia. Through some shrewd political
manipulation, Sihanouk was able to eliminate
his opponents to become the prominent
nationalist leader and obtain the country's
independence from France.
Sihanouk and Communist Insure;ency

Sihanouk set up a neutral government
so as not to alienate either communist or
Western powers. The prime minister, Penh
Nouth stated in 1953: "Although we are not
communists, we do not oppose communism
as long as the latter is not to be imposed on
our people by force from outside" (Basu 1987,
15). In fact, Cambodia tried to maintain good
relations with both China and the Soviet Union
at the beginning of their disputes. However,
it was clear that China played a much more
significant role in Cambodia. It is during this
period, however, that communist insurgencies
began taking place in Cambodia--the Khmer
Rouge started their guerrilla activities against
the Sihanouk government.
At the time Cambodia gained its
independence, the Khmer Rouge made up only
a small rag-tag organization. They had been
supported by the Soviets and trained by the
Vietnamese. However, at the Geneva Conference on Indochina of 1954, the Soviets
provided for a withdrawal of Vietminh troops
from Cambodia. The Soviets generally
considered the Cambodian communists too
insignificant among the Indochinese communists (Basu, 1987, p. 15).
As the Vietminh withdrew back into
North Vietnam, most of the old-guard of the
Cambodian communist party went with them.
But the younger and more reactionary re-

mained to continue the insurgency. This
younger group, headed by Saloth Sar (later
known as Pol Pot), Ieng Sary, and Khieu
Samphan who had been fellow students in
France, formed a new party in 1960. As a
result of their disillusionment of Vietnam and
the Soviets, this reorganized Khmer Rouge
sought China's support, and when Sino-Soviet
relations disintegrated, the Khmer Rouge sided
with the Chinese. On the other hand, the
Soviets had always strongly supported Ho Chi
Minh, and so when the split occurred, Vietnam
naturally went to the Soviet side.
The Geneva Accords of 1954 divided
Vietnam into North and South, but required
elections the next year to reunite the country
under a democratically elected government.
However, the Diem regime in the South
refused to comply, and the US expressed its
support by funneling aid to the government.
As a result, the Vietminh set out on a crusade
to unite the country under communism by
force, and thus the Vietnam War began.
Before long, the Vietnam War spilled
over into Cambodia. As Vietminh transported
supplies to the Vietcong along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail through Cambodia, South Vietnamese troops (often accompanied by US troops)
began several incursions into Cambodian
territory. US bombing campaigns in Cambodia
were soon to follow. These bombings were
not confined to the jungles, but were carried
out in central population centers as well.
Moreover, US bombing campaigns in Cambodia exceeded the magnitude of the US bombings in Iraq.
The Cambodian people blamed Sihanouk for not being able to stop the bombings.
Subsequently, civilians in the country side
became more sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge,
and the communists were able to make some
very strategic advances. Sihanouk's cabinet
began to doubt his ability to resolve the crisis,
so on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was
on a diplomatic visit abroad, the defense
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minister, Lon Nol, staged a coup and deposed
the prince.
Sihanouk's main enemies during his
years in power were the communist insurgents.
Yet only a few days after the coup, Sihanouk
announced the formation of the United Front
with the Khmer Rouge to oppose the Lon Nol
regime. Considering Sihanouk's anti-communist past, it is difficult to understand why he
allied himself with the Khmer Rouge, his
former enemies. Betrayed by his own cabinet
and by the West, Sihanouk really had no one
else to tum to. All of these events forced him
closer to the Khmer Rouge who had immediately begun wooing the prince upon his being
ousted. Sihanouk later would join with the
Khmer Rouge again in 1982 in a coalition
government that would represent the r€:Sistance
to the Soviet-backed Heng Samrin regime.
For several more years, Soviet involvement in Cambodia would be limited until
the Vietnamese invasion in 1978. However,
several important events led up to the invasion,
but which exceed the scope of this study.
Following Sihanouk's ouster, the Lon Nol
regime controlled Cambodia from 1970 to
1975. That corrupt regime, however, was
displaced by the brutal Khmer Rouge which
controlled Cambodia up until the Vietnamese
invasion. Details of these two governments
will not be discussed in detail here because
the Soviet Union had little influence with either
regime.
The pro-US Lon Nol government--the
Republic of Cambodia (RC)--was quickly
recognized by the US, and a river of US aid
gushed into the country. The Khmer Rouge
immediately began a major offensive against
the Lon Nol government, starting a bloody,
five-year civil war that left millions of
Cambodians homeless. US bombings in
Cambodia continued until 1973 when the US
began to pull out of Indochina.
Khmer Rouge troops managed to
capture the countryside and beseige Phnom

Penh by early 1975. On April 17, the Lon
Nol government surrendered to the Khmer
Rouge. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge
established the government of Democratic
Kampuchea (DK). The Khmer Rouge instituted brutal Marxist agrarian reforms, and only
a few days after they captured Phnom Penh,
they emptied the city and forced its residents
into the countryside to work on state forcedlabor farms. The Party set out to purify
society from "corruption," especially religion
and Western institutions. Schools, libraries,
and ancient Buddhist temples were destroyed.
All forms of Western technology were
deplored and forbidden including televisions,
radios, trucks, and even farm tractors. All
were destroyed or abandoned. Power sources
and even water and sewage systems were
destroyed. Currency, markets, and financial
institutions were abolished and industries were
abandoned.
A program of autogenocide was
implemented aimed at the intellectual, merchant, and elite classes who were considered
unreformably corrupt. Even people who
simply wore glasses were murdered. Children
were stripped from their parents and sent to
work on youth farms where they were
indoctrinated and forced to hard labor. Over
one million people were killed by starvation,
disease, and mass execution. Large interrogation and torture centers were set up where
hundreds of thousands were systematically
murdered. During the Khmer Rouge days,
some 400,000 Cambodians fled to Vietnam
and Thailand. The magnitude of the slaughter
and devastation caused by the Khmer Rouge
is hard to comprehend.
Part of Pol Pot's plan to restore the
ancient Khmer glory was to reclaim its ancient
territory of the Mekhong delta in southern
Vietnam. Pol Pot called for the "liberation"
of southern Vietnam and heavy fighting on
the Vietnamese border began as Khmer Rouge
troops launched numerous cross-border raids.
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Over 500,000 Vietnamese were forced to leave
their homes because of the fighting (Mysliewiec 1988, xxi). In response to these
continued attacks over three years, and with
Soviet approval, Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and ousted the Democratic Kampuchea
government on December 25, 1978. The fact
that these border attacks took place, and
therefore, that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia
was provoked, is not well known. Throughout
the following years, the Soviet Union would
continue to profess the legitimacy of the
Phnom Penh regime and would engross itself
in massive aid to Vietnam and Cambodia.

The PRK and the CGDK
In January 1979, the Vietnamese, with
Soviet backing, established the communist
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with
Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as
foreign minister (who in 1987 became prime
minister). Heng Samrin and Hun Sen were,
as were many officials of the PRK, former
Khmer Rouge officials, but part of a faction
that remained loyal to Vietnam after the split.
Both had been regional officials in the DK,
but took part in an unsuccessful uprising
against the Pol Pot regime in 1978, before
defecting to Vietnam.
Later in 1979, a new guerrilla force
opposing the. PRK was formed: the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
headed by Son Sann, one of Sihanouk' s former
mInIsters.
Thailand supported the noncommunist force and armed its troops. In
another two years, in 1981, Prince Sihanouk
returned from China and united several small
pro-Sihanouk resistance factions into the
Sihanoukist National Anny (ANS) and founded
a political organization that would control the
army--the United National Front for an
Independent, Peaceful, and Cooperative
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).

In 1982, with pressure from the US
and China, the two non-communist factions
joined with the Khmer Rouge in an uneasy
coalition in opposition to the PRK and
Vietnamese occupation forces. The coalition
was named the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) reflecting
the dominance of the Khmer Rouge which has
consistently had more than twice the number
of troops as the two non-communist factions
combined. Sihanouk became the president,
Khieu Samphan (Khmer Rouge) became the
vice-president, and Son Sann (KPNLF) became
the prime minister. Though all three factions
were under the presidency of Sihanouk, they
each retained their autonomous nature. The
coalition was given the DK's seatin the UN.
In 1985, a full-force Vietnamese
offensive overran all of the resistance bases
within Cambodia, and the CGDK forces along
with 250,000 civilians were forced across the
border into Thailand. Eight enclosed camps
were set up near the border within shelling
range of the Vietnamese army, each under
control of one of the CGDK factions. In
September, the Khmer Rouge announced the
retirement of Pol Pot in order to bolster
waning international support. Though it was
clear that Pol Pot still controlled the faction,
to their satisfaction they were able to get what
they wanted. Following the 1985 Vietnamese
offensive which nearly disabled the resistance,
the US Congress debated the issue, then
approved a substantial non-lethal aid package
to the CGDK.

The Beginnings of Refonn
For the Soviets, 1985 was a landmark
year with the arrival of Gorbachev to power
and the commencement of perestroika and
glasnost. Gorbachev began to reevaluate
Soviet policy in the Third World, especially
Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.
The costs of maintaining sponsorship of these
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movements had severely drained Soviet coffers
and limited its political objectives in other
areas. Gorbachev set out to resolve these long
term conflicts with the anticipation that the
"withdrawal from Afghanistan in addition to
the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia
and Cuban withdrawal from Angola will pay
dividends throughout Southwest and Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and Africa" (Goodman
1991, 116). Gorbachev had a specific plan
for Cambodia which he felt would end the
conflict once and for all:
The type of settlement Moscow envisioned in
1985, however, was a non-aggression pact
between Indochina and ASEAN. The war in
Kampuchea [Cambodia) would then end because
ASEAN and other outside parties would cease
aiding the Cambodian opposition groups.
Vietnamese forces would withdraw from
Cambodia, but the Heng Samrin government
would remain in power. Moscow would not
even consider the possibility of its sharing power
(Katz 1989,51).

In 1986, Nguyen Van Linh became the
head of Vietnam's Communist Party and in
the spirit of Gorbachev's reforms began trying
to end Hanoi's international isolation, mainly
caused by the Cambodian conflict. In 1987,
Hun Sen, the PRK foreign minister, was
appointed to the post of prime minister. He
undertook some dramatic reforms of the
country, and before he had been in office a
year he had led the country in an abandonment
of Marxism and in a new pursuit of a market
economy. However, he maintained the single
party rule and close ties with Vietnam. In
April 1989, the PRK changed its name to the
State of Cambodia (SOC) reflecting its
abandonment of socialism. Hun Sen's reforms
have improved the country's conditions
immensely and have resulted in the SOC
gaining considerable legitimacy in the eyes
of the Cambodian people. Many nations such
as Australia began expressing to Hun Sen that
their governments would like to recognize the

SOC as soon as it complied with UN resolutions, namely, withdrawal of all foreign troops
and permitting UN-supervised elections.
Soviet efforts to persuade Hanoi and
Phnom Penh to undertake a withdrawal just
as the Soviets had done in Afghanistan did
not have much success until 1987 when Hun
Sen agreed to participate in talks with the
resistance. This move was highly praised by
Moscow as an adoption of a reconciliation
policy which Moscow approved heartily
(Duncan and Ekedahl 1990, 155). By this
time, Soviet policy had made a major compromise. In May 1987, at a dinner for Linh,
Gorbachev stated that the Cambodian problem:
can only be solved proceeding from the highest
interests of the Cambodian people and their
legitimate right to shape their destiny themselves,
on the basis of the unification ofall their natioflill
patrioticforces.(Katz 1989,51-52, italics added).

For the first time, the Soviets conceded to
allow power sharing among the four Cambodian factions as part of the settlement. This
is evidence that the Gorbachev leadership had
reduced its commitment in defending the proSoviet regime in Phnom Penh. II As in
Afghanistan, the cost to the Soviets of propping up the regime no longer appear[ed] worth
the effort" (Katz 1989, 52).
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
visited China in February 1989 and came to
a momentous decision. The Soviets agreed
that Vietnam would unilaterally withdraw its
troops from Cambodia with no conditions.
In April, Vietnam and Cambodia announced
that Vietnam would start immediately to
withdraw its troops and called for an end of
foreign military aid to all sides and for an
international control mechanism to supervise
withdrawal and the end to foreign aid (Duncan
and Ekedah11990, 156). This meeting came
as a precursor to the Paris Conference on
Cambodia which took place in July 1989.
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The objective of the Paris Conference
was to negotiate the formation of a coalition
government and to create an international
control mechanism that would verify troop
withdrawal and the end of weapon supplies
from outside sources and to monitor democratic elections. The Conference failed on several
issues, but mostly because China, the US, and
ASEAN demanded a comprehensive settlement
while Phnom Penh refused to include the
Khmer Rouge in an interim government. In
addition, Vietnam was nearly finished with
its withdrawal from Cambodia, and the resistance was anxious to see if it could attain a
military victory. One member of the Sihanouk
delegation summed up the conferences' failure
by stating:
We are deadlocked here because the military
situation is not decisive. If there is no result
on the battlefield, there is no result at the
negotiating table ... Hun Sen thinks he can still
win the war. That is why he has made no
concessions. When he is weak, he will negotiate
(United Nations Association 1991, 52).

In September 1989, Vietnam finished
withdrawing all of its troops from Cambodia,
leaving the 45,000 troop SOC army and a
poorly equipped militia behind to fend for itself
against the 70,000 resistance guerrillas. This
withdrawal was conducted unilaterally, without
UN-supervision as a UN resolution passed in
1988 required. The resolution required that
the withdrawal be done under UN supervision
and within the framework of a comprehensive
settlement. Once Vietnam completed its
withdrawal it requested a UN team to come
to Cambodia and verify that a complete
withdrawal had taken place. The UN refused
to do so unless it was within the framework
of a comprehensive settlement. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops has not been verified
to this day.
After the withdrawal, CaDK forces
experienced moderate success in a military

offensive against the SOc. Large chunks of
northwestern Cambodia came under resistance
control. However, most of the success was
achieved by the Khmer Rouge who began
forced repatriation of refugees into the newly
controlled areas:
From the murky claims and counterclaims, it
was difficult to pinpoint precisely what appreciable gains had been made by any of the four
factions by the end of the dry season in May
1990. Three conclusions seem valid: The Khmer
Rouge had given added proof of their superiority
on the battlefield, when they cared to demonstrate it, and were building up their political and
administrative infrastructure inside Cambodia;
the noncommunist groups seemed somewhat
better organized and more effective militarily
than in previous years but were tainted by their
association with the Khmer Rouge and had
limited capability to affect events on the ground;
and although the SOC armed forces had not
collapsed under the CGDK's military pressure,
they were nonetheless hard pressed to fend off
attacks from a variety of quarters. These were
some of the realities that had implications at the
negotiating table. (United Nations Association
1991, 54)

Development of a Comprehensive Political
Settlement
One of the first peace proposals for
the Cambodian conflict was presented in 1981
after the International Conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN proposed a comprehensive
settlement--ironically--very similar to the one
that was finally adopted ten years later. The
proposal involved UN-supervised disarmament
of all Khmer factions, Vietnamese withdrawal,
and free elections involving all four factions.
However, at that time, both China and the US
opposed any proposal that would include the
PRK in any power-sharing agreement or that
would in any way allow the Vietnameseinstalled government any legitimacy. The
Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the PRK also
rejected the plan because they opposed any
role for the Khmer Rouge. Since then, several
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proposals have been offered, but all have been
rejected mainly over this issue of powersharing. China and the US would not accept
a power-sharing role for the PRK; Vietnam
and the PRK would not accept a power-sharing
role for the Khmer Rouge; and Sihanouk,
China, and the US would not accept a settlement without a role for the Khmer Rouge.
The result has been a stalemate in which no
peace plan could succeed until there was a
substantial compromise.
The Australians drew up a detailed draft
proposal offering several configurations for
an enhanced UN role in a comprehensive
settlement. The Australian proposal recognized that the central challenge to a peace
settlement was the issue of power-sharing
between the factions until a new government
could be elected. Therefore, the Australian
proposal provided for the UN to create an
international control mechanism that would
involve a peacekeeping force and UN administration of the country until a newly elected
government could replace it. In the meantime,
no single Cambodian party would be able to
determine the country's destiny. It provided
for important issues such as how to implement
a cease-fire, how to run free elections, and
how to ensure a politically neutral administration in the transition period. Shortly after
Evans announced the Australian proposals,
the five permanent members of the Security
Council adopted the issue onto their agenda.
On January 15-16, 1990, the five
permanent members of the Security Council,
including the Soviets, met in Paris to examine
the Australian proposals and write up a plan
based on its suggestions. The permanent five
draft included the formation of a Supreme
National Council (SNC), a quadripartite body
made up of representatives from each of the
four factions. The SNC would be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty, hold the seat
at the UN, and function in a delegative

capacity to the transitional authority. However, this draft plan did not specify the scope
of UN involvement in the administration of
the government.
In a communique issued by the
permanent five at their January 1990 meeting,
they stated that "all Cambodians should enjoy
the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities
to participate in the election process" (United
Nations Association 1991, 56). This statement
and the exclusion of the usual pledge regarding
a "non-return to the universally condemned
policies and practices of the recent past"
indicate that the Khmer Rouge were given full
license to participate in the proposed elections.
This may have been a "realistic acceptance
that the Khmer Rouge must be allowed to
compete in elections so that their (presumed)
defeat would allow China a graceful exit"
(United Nations Association 1991, 56).
At first, Vietnam and the Hun Sen
regime strongly opposed any such UN
intervention that would violate its sovereignty
and disregard its claimed legitimacy. However, the Soviet Union was their main source
of subsistence, and the Soviets had fully
participated in drawing up the UN plan. The
Soviets obviously became concerned that the
Hun Sen government would not agree to a
settlement that the Soviets had a hand in
writing (Vinogradov 1990). With continued
pressure from the Soviets, the Hun Sen
government yielded and agreed in principle
to the UN plan.
The five permanent members of the
Security Council met again in March 1990
and outlined the scope of involvement which
the UN was willing to take. This proposed
international control mechanism was to be
called the UN Transitional Authority of
Cambodia (UNT AC). It proposed that the
SNC would delegate to UNT AC all necessary
powers to administer the government, but
would be consulted by and give advice to
UNTAC. UNTAC would be headed by a
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special representative of the Secretary-General
who would be given considerable powers over
Cambodian territory in order to protect the
Cambodian people from economic and social
discrimination and protect their fundamental
rights.
Japan invited the Cambodian factions
to Tokyo on June 5, 1990 in order to decide
on important issues of the settlement, particularly the makeup of the SNC. Despite a
Khmer Rouge boycott in protest over a
diplomatic formality it did not approve of, the
remaining parties were able to come to a
decision on the SNC. It was agreed that the
council would be made up of 12 representatives, six from the SOC and six from the three
resistance forces (two each).
In July 1990, US Secretary of State
James Baker announced a major policy
reversal. Due to increased pressure at home,
a realization that the Khmer Rouge could
possibly return to power, and the increased
legitimacy of the Hun Sen government, the
US retracted its recognition of the resistance
coalition and opened talks with the SOC and
Vietnam. Though this surprising reversal of
US policy was popular in the US and other
Western countries, it outraged the ASEAN
nations who accused the US of trying to pull
the rug out from under its friends. On August
6, the US held its first talks with Vietnam on
Cambodia, and then in September 6 with the
SOC.
Through continued and difficult
negotiations, the Cambodian factions finally
came to an agreement on the UN plan. Then
on September 20, 1991, the Security Council
adopted resolution 668 showing unanimity and
support for the proposed expanded role of the
UN in Cambodia. General Assembly resolution 45/3, adopted on October 15, 1990,
showed the full support of the Assembly for
Security Council resolution 668.
During 1991, several events took place
making significant progress towards the signing

of the peace agreement. A cease-fire finally
was implemented between the factions in May,
but both sides accused each other of violations.
In a meeting in June, all members of the SNC
agreed to an indefinite cease-fire and to stop
accepting foreign arms. In July, Sihanouk
resigned from his post as head of FUNCINPEC to become the neutral leader of the
SNC. A significant decision was reached by
the SNC in August in which it was decided
to disband only 70% of current military forces
and put the remainder under UN control. In
September, the SNC resumed meetings in New
York where its members agreed to a compromise system of elections providing for
proportional representation that would allow
each faction places in the Parliament based
on its share of the popular vote. Finally, on
October 23, 1991, the Paris Conference on
Cambodia was reconvened and the UN peace
plan was signed by all four Cambodian parties
and 18 other involved nations ending more
than 20 years of civil war.

Soviet Incentives for Concession
Examining the events and the involvement of the Soviets in the Cambodian
crisis, a major shift of policy has been
identified where the Soviets began exerting
pressure on Vietnam and Phnom Penh to settle
the dispute. Most significant has been the
Soviet's position as a permanent member of
the UN Security Council and as a co-writer
of the UN peace plan. Though Phnom Penh
fervently resisted at first, it has conceded to
Soviet pressures and has accepted the settlement. A closer look at why the Soviets have
made this policy change is warranted.
According to Kolodziej and Kanet there
are five main constraints to Soviet expansion
in the Third World:
1.

Developing countries have an increasing ability to resist subordination and
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2.

3.

4.

5.

to manipulate the Soviets for their own
advantage.
The Soviets have been checked by the
economic and military power of the
US and its Western allies.
Divisions within the socialist camp-notably the Sino-Soviet split.
Receding relevance of the Soviet model
to many Third World countries.
Scarce economic and technological
resources commanded by Moscow to
project its power and purposes abroad
(1989, xiii-xiv).

Developing countries have increased
their ability to resist subordination, not only
to the Soviets, but any country that might pose
a threat. Small Third World countries have
taken a very aggressive posture in international
organizations, particularly the UN. Through
bloc voting, the Third World has been able
to bring about several programs such as the
UNO P that directly favor their particular needs
and often conflict with the interests of the Big
Powers. Not only have they been able to
protect themselves from subordination, but
they have been able to attain many objectives
at the expense of the industrialized countries
(Bennett 1991, 291). In the case of Southeast
Asia, Vietnam has been able to take considerable advantage of the Soviet Union. Vietnam's
isolation from the rest of the world made it
so that it could only trade with the CMEA
countries. Its trade with the Soviets was highly
imbalanced and the Soviets gained little more
than an ideological victory in the aftermath
of the US-Vietnam War.
Though the Soviets have been able to
move into Vietnam after the US pulled out,
the US military presence in nearby Philippines
and elsewhere remained a continual threat to
Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. The
economic power of the US and its allies has
been a considerable constraint on Soviet
expansion in the region. The isolation of
Cambodia and Vietnam by Western and
ASEAN countries has impoverished Indochi-

nese economies which have stagnated and
lacked significant development.
As was discussed above, the division
between Soviet and Chinese communists caused
a multitude of problems for the Soviets in
Indochina. Its current dilemma in Cambodia
is a product of that conflict with the Khmer
Rouge in the Chinese camp, and the PRK in
the Soviet camp. However, since 1989,
relations between the Soviets and China have
warmed considerably. Their joint agreement
in Beijing that Vietnam would withdraw from
Cambodia and that all foreign military support
to the Cambodian factions should end was a
landmark decision. The fact that the Soviet's
made most of the concessions is an indication
that the Gorbachev government is anxious to
wrap up this drawn out conflict and move on
to more productive pursuits.
The Third World perceives the Soviet
Union as ideologically bankrupt. MarxismLeninism is not widely perceived to apply to
the conditions of developing countries today.
In addition, the economic problems that the
Soviet Union is facing at home has made it
a non-model of economic development that
is encouraging Third World countries to look
for other models, mostly that of the US and
the NICs. The rapid economic development
that occurred in the Soviet Union in its happier
days has all but ceased. Its inability to adjust
to the needs and impulses of the day has
plowed its economic system into the ground.
This, obviously, is what the developing nations
are trying to avoid, not replicate.
Probably most significant of all these
issues is that scarce economic and technological resources have become more scarce
than ever in recent years and have eventually
concl uded in the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Faced with this economic turmoil which has
impacted even Moscow, the Soviets can no
longer afford the expansive aid commitments
to developing countries. In fact, this has been
a rising concern of the Soviets for some time
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and a major reevaluation of Soviet aid commitments and pTactices have been undertaken.
On June 13, 1990, the Supreme Soviet adopted
a resolution instructing the Council of Ministers "to work on cutting back the amount of
aid we give" (Arefyeva 1990). Arefyeva, a
columnist for Izvestia, summarized the debate
concerning the Supreme Soviet's resolution
by stating:
I'd like to congratulate the Deputies on an
important step toward glasnost ... At the same
time, however, one can only regret the fact that
the question had been posed so narrowly and
deals only with the volume of aid. For the
problem is not one of volume ... The essence of
the problem lies elsewhere-namely, in the thrust
and objectives of our aid ... We should be talking
about a full review of our aid policy, which
would in turn lead to a reduction. At any rate,
provided we base our reasoning not on ideology,
as in the past, but on humanitarian considerations
and sober economic calculation (Arefyeva 1990).

This was followed by a decree from Gorbachev
on July 24, 1990:
In implementing measures to further expand
economic cooperation with developing countries,
it is to base this cooperation on the principles
of mutual benefit and mutual interest, guided
by international norms and practice. It is to
proceed from the premise that economic aid must
be provided with due regard for our country's
real capabilities (Gorbachev 1990).

When the head of the socialist countries
department of the USSR Council of Ministers'
State Foreign Economic Council, V. Demchuk,
was asked about Gorbachev's decree, he
responded by saying that the main countries
in concern were Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. "Take Vietnam, for example," he said.
"One can cite a good many costly projects that
were taken on without proper consideration,
resulting in the squandering of a lot of money"
(Romanyuk 1990). Vietnam possibly represen ts the largest aid package the Soviets offer.
It is estimated that Vietnam receives over $1.2

billion per year, a large portion of which goes
to their military (Duncan and Ekedahl 1990,
154).
With the recent breakup of the Soviet
Union, continued aid to Vietnam and Cambodia is clearly at risk. However, in the years
leading up to the union's collapse, it would
not have seemed likely for the Soviets to
consider abandoning Indochina. Even so, it
was obvious that the Soviets were anxious to
reduce Indochina's dependency upon Soviet
resources, and tried to do so by three methods.
First, the Soviets tried to encourage more
efficient use of its aid and prompted Vietnam
and Cambodia to pursue market economies.
Second, in order to reduce Vietnam and
Cambodia's dependency, the Soviets have tried
to facilitate the integration of Indochina into
the booming economic structure of the ASEAN
nations and make them eligible for internationalloans. And third, in an attempt to improve
their image in the region, the Soviets have
reduced their military presence in Southeast
Asia with a huge reduction of troops and navy
at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
Previous to Gorbachev, the Soviets
underwrote the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. Soviet-bloc aid provided the
Phnom Penh regime with more than threefourths of its budget. Recently, the Soviets
began cutting aid to Cambodia: "The USSR
and Eastern European states are cutting
economic aid to Cambodia and introducing
'pay-as-you-go' exchanges and loans payable
in hard currency" (Goodman 1991, 180). This
changing-the-rules-of-the-game will make a
serious impact on Cambodia. Though Hun
Sen had originally rejected the UN peace
settlement, the plan provided for a commitment
of some 22 nations to aid Cambodia in its
reconstruction efforts--a very attractive offer
considering the fact that the Soviets could no
longer be counted on. With the breakup of
the Soviet Union after the attempted coup in
August 1991, the SOC realized that a perma-
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nent cessation of Soviet aid was imminent and
it would have to make major concessions and
accept the UN plan which offered its only hope
of survival.
Other factors responsible for the
Soviet's eagerness for Vietnam and Phnom
Penh to resolve the conflict through the UN
plan are: 1) the Soviets could not foresee any
military solution to the problem, 2) US-Sino
relations were strengthened against the Soviet
Union largely because of the Cambodian
conflict, and 3) the conflict prohibited rapprochement with ASEAN which Moscow saw
as crucial for both the Soviet Union and for
Indochina's integration into the regional and
global economy.
Considering the Soviet Union's wider
international objectives and its current economic vulnerability, Moscow knew it would
have to depend on international support. This
put military intervention of any sort out of the
question. The hope of SOC troops obtaining
a military victory on their own was not
realistic after the fighting in 1990 ended in
stalemate that slightly favored the resistance.
The only alternative was a peaceful settlement.
Poor SimrSoviet relations had for years
hindered Soviet objectives in Asia, especially
when the US joined with China on the
Cambodian issue. For the last two decades ,
no Asian country would want to increase
Soviet presence for fear of antagonizing the
Chinese. [n 1989, Gorbachev made some
strong overtures to China by unilaterally
meeting three of Beijing's conditions for
reconciliation: withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and
unilateral Soviet troop reductions on the SinoSoviet border (Goodman 1991, 110).
In 1987, Gorbachev sent a strong
message to ASEAN nations that it was
committed to rapprochement. For the first
time ever, a Soviet Foreign Minister (Shevardnadze) visited Thailand and Indonesia. The
visits were for the purpose of finding a solution

to the Cambodian crisis, which was used as
the campaign for rapprochement. Soviet
objectives with the ASEAN states has been
to:
enhance its political image, increase its economic
participation in the region's rapid growth,
facilitate the political and economic integration
of the communist countries of the region into
regional affairs (in order to reduce their reliance
on Moscow's largesse), and improve the environment for its own strategic objectives (Duncan
and Ekedahl 1990, 157).

With a resolution to the Cambodian conflict,
the Soviets would be able to pursue these
objectives. Especially now with the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis
they are facing, the Soviets more than ever
will need the support of ASEAN, the US,
China, as well as the rest of the international
community. Thus, the Soviets have continued
to encourage and provide incentives for Hanoi
and Phnom Penh to submit to the provisions
of the UN peace plan.
Conclusion
For years, the Cambodian conflict has
been a complex skein of contradicting interests
and violent confrontation. The Soviet Union
stood opposed by the US and China who each
supported different Cambodian contingents
in this very "international" civil war. But
since 1985, significant moves were made by
Hanoi and Phnom Penh which allowed for a
comprehensive settlement to take place. First,
Vietnam withdrew all its troops in 1989. Then
in 1991, Phnom Penh agreed to sign an unprecedented peace treaty ending the two
decades of violence.
Most of the analyses focusing on the
recent developments of the Cambodian
settlement have centered attention on the policy
implemented by the US and China and its
impact on the decisions of Vietnam and
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Cambodia. However, they have neglected the
fact that the Soviet Union, since 1985, has
played a major role in influencing those
decisions. The Soviets encouraged a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, reduced their
aid to both countries, and undertook a campaign to integrate them into the region
politically and economically.
The central incentive for the Soviets
to encourage a speedy settlement was its
economic concerns. The devastating economic
decline in the Soviet Union made it incapable
of attending to its former Third World commitments. The Soviets closely reexamined their
development aid programs and instituted some
sweeping reforms. Vietnam and Cambodia,
who depended mostly on the Soviet Union for
their survival, realized that their economic aid
was in jeopardy and that they must end their

international isolation in order to avoid
disaster. When the attempted coup in the
Soviet Union resulted in its breakup, Phnom
Penh realized its aid would be ceased and it
would have to depend on the wider world for
its survival. Thus, it would have to come to
terms with the UN comprehensive settlement.
On October 23, 1991, Phnom Penh
and the Cambodian resistance factions signed
the peace treaty and initiated the huge UN
operation that will dismantle the Hun Sen
government and operate the country's key
ministries until a new coalition government
is elected through UN-supervised elections.
Several challenges to the UN operation still
lie ahead, but with unanimity in the UN
Security Council, chances are greatly improved
that the operation will be successful and that
peace will finally be restored to the war-torn
country.
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